In my last post I focused primarily on demonstrating analytic philosophy’s disinterest in postmodern philosophy. I touched briefly on why postmodernism has become so attractive to contemporary theologians. I mentioned that it is a philosophy that requires less rigor and discipline than its analytic counterpart and holds out more interesting conclusions. Analytic philosophers are often more careful and painstaking in working toward a conclusion than their postmodern counterparts, and since theologians rarely have the time or the background knowledge to participate in the analytic enterprise, they find postmodernism more promising. But as I indicated in the previous post, this hardly explains all of the reasons behind contemporary theology’s captivation with postmodernism. I concluded by asking readers to offer up their reasons for this phenomenon. I received several responses, each of which was helpful toward an answer, but none of which get at the dominant reasons. To find out why theologians are so enamored with postmodernism, where better to turn than those theologians so enamored with postmodernism?
Lyotard a Friend of the Church?
James K. A. Smith, is convinced that postmodern philosopher Jean-François Lyotard does not have the Biblical message in his sights when he defines the term postmodern as “incredulity toward metanarratives.” Furthermore, Smith believes that Christians have largely misinterpreted what Lyotard means by “metanarrative.” Discussing Lyotard’s philosophy, he states:
For Lyotard, the term metanarrative [grand récit] does not simply refer to a “grand story” in the sense of stories that have grand or universal pretensions, or even make universal claims. What is at stake is not the scope of these narratives but the nature of the claims they make. For Lyotard, metanarratives are a distinctly modern phenomenon: they are stories which not only tell a grand story (since even premodern and tribal stories do this), but also claim to be able to legitimate the story and its claims by an appeal to universal Reason (James K. A. Smith, “A Little Story about Metanarratives”, Christianity and the Postmodern Turn, ed. Myron B. Penner [Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005], 124-25).
According to Smith, Lyotard only intended a critique of modernity and appeals to universal, unsituated, autonomous Reason (capital “R”). Christianity of the Augustinian tradition – as he describes it – is not based on this kind of reason, but rather a faith-based reason, and is therefore not a metanarrative in the Lyotardian sense. Smith believes that Lyotard has in mind metanarratives such as Hegelianism, Marxism, the Enlightenment view of science and history, etc.
Lest he be falsely characterized, Smith qualifies his argument by stating that he is not suggesting that Lyotard intended to help Christians understand their faith, but rather that since Christians should oppose this kind of autonomous reasoning, they should find Lyotard an ally – instead of foe – of the church against the Enlightenment and modernist project (Smith, 133). Smith likewise finds an ally in postmodern philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault (See his Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism: Taking Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault to Church, 2006).
So for the purpose of working toward an answer to our question here, Smith as a theologian and philosopher, believes that postmodernism offers us a more biblical approach to philosophy by defending Christian faith against attacks that it is contrary to universal reason. Postmodernism, according to Smith, opposes that which opposes Christianity, namely, modernism.
John Franke writing an essay in the same book, offers a similar reasons for his appreciation for postmodernism, though without the examination of any postmodern philosophers.
Foundationalism’s Demise?
Another reason that so many theologians are interested in postmodernism is its non/post-foundational nature (for those who may be unclear on what foundationalism is, read up here). In their mind, modernism is so associated with foundationalism that to be a modernist is to be a foundationalist and to be a foundationalist is to be a modernist. For this reason, virtually every theologian who declares him/herself a postmodernist also declares him/herself a postfoundationalist (or some such term). But why? For many it seems to make room for faith. If we base all of our beliefs on clear and distinct ideas (Descartes) or on what is evident to the senses (Locke) or even a combination of these (Kantian categories of the mind combined with sensory data), belief in God is not possible. Theism had a difficult time under the Enlightment and modernism. But if we deny that we need to base all of our beliefs on certain privileged foundational beliefs then we are open to assume God’s existence and the validity of the claims of Scripture. Thus Stanley Grenz and John Franke take as their starting point the Christian worldview framework without defending it. For them this includes Scripture, church tradition and culture. According to them, the Spirit is at work revealing himself in each of these and thus they are legitimate sources of knowledge for the Christian. Following Wolfhart Pannenberg they view all claims to truth as future-oriented. Certainty can not be achieved in this life. Until the consumation of the kingdom, all claims to truth are subject to revision and knowledge is tentative. Discussing Pannenberg’s view of truth, Grenz writes:
In contrast to the classical tradition, he declares that truth is not found in the unchanging essences lying behind the flow of time, but is essentially historical and ultimately eschatological. Until the eschaton, truth will remain provisional and truth claims contestable. Therefore, theology. like all human knowledge, is provisional. It simply cannot pack into formulas the truth of God. The future alone is the focal point of ultimate truth. As a result. all dogmatic statements are hypotheses to be tested for coherence with other knowledge. This, he claims, is in accordance with the Scriptures, which declare that only at the end of history is the deity of God unquestionably open to all-an event. however, that is anticipated in the present (Stanley J. Grenz, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Quest for Ultimate Truth“, The Christian Century [September 14-21, 1988]: 796).
To recap, here are the primary reasons for theology’s interest in postmodern:
1) Postmodernism critiques metanarratives which are grand stories that appeal to universal reason. Christianity is exempt as a metanarrative and thus postmodernism can be appropriated as an ally against modernist critiques of Christianity.
2) Postmodernism is anti/post-foundationalist in character and allows allows theology to assume multiple starting points or no starting point at all.
While there are other reasons for theology’s interest in postmodernism, these are the dominant reasons. I have something to say by way of evaluation, but I’d like to hear what you think. Do you agree with theology’s appropriation of postmodernism or do you see problems with it? If there is little discussion, I’ll offer a post evaluating theology’s interest in postmodernism.
1) Christianity is certainly not exempt from being a metanarrative, in my opinion.
2) Christianity should be foundationalistic, in my opinion.
But maybe I am defining these things in a different way.
Jonathan,
Given Smith’s interpretation of Lyotard and metanarrative, why do you think Christianity still counts as a metanarrative?
Why do you think Christianity should be foundationalist?
IF Lyotard wants to define metanarrative as legitimizing a “story and its claims by an appeal to universal Reason.” Then I wouldn’t say it is metanarrative in this sense. Christinaity doesn’t appeal to any “R”eason. However, I don’t see why I should confine myself to Lyotard’s use of the term. I would say Christianity, aside from fitting the traditional use of metanarrative, can be “legitmized” by appeal to reason. A universal reason (small r) in that it is common to all men and that all men must operate by God’s reason.
Christianity should be foundationalistic in holding to God’s being (as defined in Scriputre) as a basic belief which all other beliefs depend upon.
By the way, I tried to respond on my blog but it wouldn’t let me for some reason… must be some kinda bug or something.
Given Smith’s definition of metanarratives, it seems that Christianity–at least what has traditionally been called orthodox christianity–is not a metanarrative since it does not seek to legitimate itself with an appeal to universal reason. Appealing to universal reason seems distinctively modernistic, and of course Christianity thrived for hundreds of years before modernism. However, there are various ways of understanding what christianity is and how we arrive at believing it. Some understandings of christianity today have been impacted by modernism to more or less degrees. Where modernism has impacted ways of understanding christianity more, christians are more likely to appeal to reason and rationality to show that christianity is true: “if you just examine the evidence with an unbiased mind, you will see that chrisianity is true.” Such understandings of christianity are closer to what Smith calls a metanarrative insofar as they’ve been influenced by modernism to a larger degree. But at least good ol’ fashioned christianity is immune to the label of metanarrative according to Smith. And whether his definition is a good one is still up for debate.
As for the second point–”2) Postmodernism is anti/post-foundationalist in character and allows theology to assume multiple starting points or no starting point at all”–it is not clear that one must turn to postmodernism to be anti/post-foundationalist, depending on how you’re understanding foundationalism. For example one can reject classical foundationalism and still fall in the analytic philosophical tradition (for example Alvin Plantinga). So since one can be an anti-foundationalist without being a postmodernist and since being a postmodernist brings with it added unfortunate baggage, the theologian should have a better reason for turning to postmodernism. This is to say you can be postmodern but don’t have to be a postmodernist.
Fraiser,
I tried to answer these two questions yesterday but after clicking “say it!” it simply refreshed the page without posting what I wrote. I don’t really feel like trying to say it again right now but maybe I’ll come back someother time and expound some more.
John,
This is not an area of expertise for me. But, let me venture a summary and a few reactions, and you tell me if they make sense or not–and they may not.
So, the theologians in question seem to be functioning with an unbending confidence in the proverb “Your enemy’s enemy is your friend and your enemy’s friend is your enemy.” Because postmodernism opposes modernism, it is on the side of Christianity. Because much of modern thought is foundationalist, the two are identical.
Doesn’t it seem like such theologians have something of a messiah complex? It seems like they really believe that Christianity is facing its ultimate peril (from modernism), and if they don’t save it (by turning to the ally postmodernism) all hope will be lost? I think they overrate both themselves and their endeavor. This was also the conviction of protestant “liberals” at the beginning of the twentieth century. They really believed that secular modernism would obliterate Christianity if they did not negotiate a compromise between the two.
They also seem to overrate the impact of modernism. The enlightenment did profoundly change the thinking of the west about reality, but that is not the same as changing reality itself. They seem to think that God will somehow vanish from existence if the number of people out there who claim the moniker “Christian” grows too small. Of course we all want more people to submit themselves to God, but the fact that people rebel against their Creator shouldn’t make us afraid for his safety.
Sometimes very small children believe that they can hide from their parents by closing their eyes–since they can no longer see their parents, they assume their parents are no longer there. The theologians you discuss seem to me like a closed-eyed child who, wanting his mother to be present, angrily rejects the sense of sight and anyone who trys to explain that he would see her just fine if he opened his eyes.
Make any sense?
Dave – Glad you found our blog. Hope all is well at NIU. Thank you for your insightful comments. You have anticipated much of the critique I would offer of Smith, Franke, Grenze, et al. I wish that these theologians were more nuanced in their understanding of foundationalism. What they are really critiquing is CLASSICAL foundationalism, but they hardly ever distinguish it. You are right that Plantinga’s (and many others) brand of foundationalism is immuned largely from their critique. So it is an overreaction to say that foundationalism is dead. In fact, William Alston argues that foundationalism (of one variety or another) is still the dominant epistemological paradigm in philosophy.
I also agree with you that there are certain types of Christianities are not immuned to Smith’s interpretation of Lyotard’s metanarrative. There are some approaches that seek to establish Christian faith on an appeal to universal reason (I’m thinking of Josh McDowell here). Still, I think that Smith has only given us one half of Lyotard. There are not a few statements that Lyotard makes that serve as an attack on any claim to final absolute truth. For example, Lyotard states that acceptable narratives (as opposed to metanarratives) are ones in which “the people are only that which actualizes the narratives.” Smith comments, following this statement that “Legitimation is not demanded but rather implicit in the narrative itself as a story of the people.” Metanarratives, as Smith interprets Lyotard are “appeals to criteria of legitimation that are understood as standing outside any particular language game and thus guarantee ‘universal’ truth (Smith 130). The problem with Smith’s interpretation is that Lyotard’s statement as well as Smith’s interpretation is very much hostile to the doctrine that I hold. I do not think that the legitimation of the truth of Christianity is “implicit in the narrative itself as a story of the people.” Something (rather, Someone) who transcends story and narrative legitimates the story and narrative itself. Christianity’s legitimation, while not coming from universal, autonomous, human reason, does not come from the story itself. Furthermore, if a metanarrative understands its legitimation to stand “outside any particular language game and thus guarantee ‘universal’ truth”, then Christianity, as I understand it and as the church confesses constitutes a metanarrative and is thus opposed by Lyotard. So I think Smith misunderstands Lyotard greatly if he thinks Lyotard is an ally of the church.
I’m not sure I understand what you mean by the difference between being postmodern and being a postmodernist. I’ve never heard anyone conceptually distinguish these before.
Jonathan – I know the frustration of writing a response and having it deleted. For that reason, I copy my comment (just like I will in a minute) before I click “say it!” I hope you can find the time to comment again. I’d love to know what you think.
Kevin – I agree that the theologians mentioned have assumed that the worst enemy is modernism and that since postmodernism is against modernism it must be an ally to Christianity. If you get a chance to read James K. A. Smith’s WHO’S AFRAID OF POSTMODERNISM (which is less than 100 pages) you’ll find that this is nearly his whole thesis.
I found the following statement that you made very insightful: “They also seem to overrate the impact of modernism. The enlightenment did profoundly change the thinking of the west about reality, but that is not the same as changing reality itself. They seem to think that God will somehow vanish from existence if the number of people out there who claim the moniker ‘Christian’ grows too small. Of course we all want more people to submit themselves to God, but the fact that people rebel against their Creator shouldn’t make us afraid for his safety.” I have been guilty of feeling this way myself at times. Christ builds his church, not pre-modernism, modernism, or post-modernism. In truth, we are not citizens of any of these cultures. I take it that the primary message in the Letter of Revelation is that in whatever age Christians find themselves, they are to live above the culture as well as against it as peculiar people, as aliens and strangers (1 Pet 2:9). Thus, there seems to be a problem with identifying Christians identifying themselves by the culture whether pre-modern, modern, postmodern.
Thank you all for the dialogue…let’s keep it going!
John,
I haven’t read any of Smith’s stuff, but–if I understand correctly–he appears to be one of those who looks at postmodernism as our friend because it is our enemy’s enemy. Are you saying that he accuses others while himself being guilty?
Kevin,
Sorry, I meant to say that Smith’s thesis is that modernism is the enemy, postmodernism is the enemy of modernism therefore postmodernism (at least of the Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault variety) is the church’s friend. I didn’t mean to convey that he is critiquing others who say this.
Fraiser,
Insightful comments about Lyotard’s view of metanarratives. It would be surprising to me indeed if his view of metanarratives didn’t actually include Christianity if we look at what else he says about them (as you pointed out). So I agree that Smith is overly hasty in finding an ally for Christianity in Lyotard’s understanding of metanarratives.
The distinction between ‘postmodern’ and ‘postmodernism’ comes from Veith (Postmodern Times, cf vii-viii and 42). It is not especially significant, but ‘postmodern’ refers mainly to a time period, so that we are all in this sense postmodern while ‘postmodernism’ refers to a particular way of thinking. The point being we can live in a postmodern world (one in which modernism has already occurred) but still not be postmodernists (thinking like someone who buys into postmodernism’s ideology).
Kudos on the blog. Very impressive post; you’re dealing with some important issues. I find them especially fascinating having studied theology and now studying analytic philosophy. Everyone is talking about the importance and prevalence of postmodernism in theological circles but in analytic philosophy, most people don’t even acknowledge its existence.
Dave – Thanks for a first hand confirmation that postmodernism is largely ignored in analytic philosophy. I wonder if in a decade or so it will play more of a role in analytic philosophy, especially given the increase in popularity of Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s philosophy of late, which is usually the gateway to postmodern philosophy for analytic philosophers.
I’m a little embarrassed because I’ve read Veith’s book and don’t remember that section.
“Sorry, I meant to say that Smith’s thesis is that modernism is the enemy, postmodernism is the enemy of modernism therefore postmodernism (at least of the Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault variety) is the church’s friend.”
I don’t think this is Smith’s thesis, at all. I don’t think that he thinks modernism is the enemy, any more than he would call postmodernism the enemy. I think he would say that both modernism and postmodernism get some thing right and some things wrong and that postmodernism has some valuable things to say about the things that modernism gets wrong. He even says on p. 26 of “Who’s Afraid …” that postmodernism doesn’t make a “clean break” with modernism and he points out that Derrida and Foucault consider themselves to be Enlightenment thinkers. So I don’t think Smith would say modernism and postmodernism are enemies.
Fraiser,
Ironically I was just rewriting my response that was never posted when I noticed that it has now been posted…. Still, let me add a little:
1) Christianity does not appeal to autonomous reason but the presupposition is not without legitimization. What justification does Lyotard for confining metanarrative to be legitimized by autonomous reason rather than transcendental reason?
2) Foundationalism defined as a justification of beliefs based on basic beliefs certainly applies to Christian Presuppositionalism. Christian theism is properly basic in being the precondition to intelligibility.
You state, “If we base all of our beliefs on clear and distinct ideas (Descartes) or on what is evident to the senses (Locke) or even a combination of these (Kantian categories of the mind combined with sensory data), belief in God is not possible…” and I would agree. However, these are not our only options, we may base our beliefs on the revelation of God.
It is great to read a post on chaos and old night that is so progressive. I think that the assertion that Christianity is not a meta-narrative in the way that lyotard describes it is correct. However, in his study of the postmodern condition he does mention something approaching christianity in critique. The question is whether he is critiquing christianity itself or modernist forms of it.
It will probably not make you happy but a lot of theologians who take similar take to yourself on postmodernism find Barth to be a postmodern theologian in this sense. Have you yet seen either Karl Barth: foundation of postmodern thoelogy or Graham Ward’s Work on Barth and Derrida.
Richard-
I was wondering where you’ve been lately. It’s good to see you are checking in on us on occasion. Yes, I’ve looked a Graham Ward’s work on Barth and Derrida (among others work on that connection as well). There has been quite a bit of counter argument to Ward and friends.
On the matter of which Christianity Lyotard is critiquing, perhaps if you read my lengthy comment above to Dave, you’ll see why I think James K. A. Smith has misrepresented Lyotard, and why I think Lyotard is criticizing Christianity modern or otherwise. Thanks for stopping in…hope to see you more often.