I just finished Harry Frankfurt’s book On Truth. Many of you may know Frankfurt’s work from his surprisingly popular little book On Bullshit. (As a testimony to how popular it is, my co-workers have been completely disinterested in the many books that I have brought into work over the years, but when I brought in a book with “Bullshit” in the title, many were asking if they could read it next.)
On Truth is the sequel, as it were, to On Bullshit. It’s a quick and enjoyable read intended for the non-philosopher. Frankfurt’s purpose is to show why truth is important and why everyone should value truth. Inevitably, he comes up against postmodernism. After reading his description of postmodernism, I couldn’t help but notice how controversial it is.
I’ve put together a poll on Frankfurt’s view of postmodernism and would like to know what you — a brilliant and perceptive analyst – think. Here’s the jist of what Frankfurt says about postmodernism and/or postmodernists. Once you’ve read it, go cast your vote on whether he accurately describes postmodernism:
1. Postmodernists have a cavalier attitude toward the truth (p. 17).
2. Postmodernists rebelliously and self-righteously deny that truth has any genuinely objective reality at all (p. 19).
3. Postmodernists deny that truth is worthy of any obligatory deference or respect (p. 19).
4. Postmodernists think that truth is simply a matter of how you look at things (pp. 20-21).
5. Postmodernism means that “what a person regards as true either is a function merely of the person’s individual point of view or is determined by what the person is constrained to regard as true by various complex and inescapable social pressures” (p. 21).
6. Postmodernists think that historical analysis and social commentary are “always heavily influenced by the personal circumstances and attitudes of the people who make them, and for this reason we cannot expect them to be rigorously impartial and objective”(p. 26).
7. Postmodernists believe that judgments of fact “only express personal feelings and attitudes that are, strictly speaking, neither true nor false” (p. 28).
Given that I’ve accurately and thoroughly described Frankfurt’s view….
Lol, I bought his book On Bullshit and I carried it around for at least a week and every time I met a friend I would say, “hey I found a book about your life.” I know, I know, it was a cheesy joke…
When I saw his book On Truth I didn’t pick it up because the title just didn’t jump out at me like his other one. If I ever write a book I’m going to make the title an expletive.
By the way, I voted “what’s postmodernism because I don’t know enough about it technically to vote. I know some people who say they are postmodern and give example of mere cultural diversity…
Jonathan,
Thanks for the anecdote. I found On Truth much more useful than its vulgar predecessor. It’s the kind of book you could easily finish waiting in line for a table at restaurants or riding in the car. There was much in the book that conflicts with Plantinga’s epistemology though. I think Plantinga is still vindicated though.
You know, the night I posted my comments I happened to find myself at B&N and picked up a copy of On Truth, I also saw Plantinga’s “The Nature of Necessity” and picked up that as well. I only read On Truth for about 15 minutes that night and got about half way through, I would be interested to read a longer book of his. I’m not sure that I’m ready for Plantinga’s Nature of Necessity.
By the way, B&N is ridiculously expensive. Plantinga’s book was 34 bucks and Franfurt’s was 12… 46+ bucks for a book and a half.
Jonathan,
You may be interested in Frankfurt’s “The Reasons of Love”. I read a few pages in a store the other day…the parts I read were interesting. In the first chapter he raises the question of “how we should live” and discusses how morality is not always the most important factor in shaping our desires and conduct (I found this to be an interesting idea).
Here is a quote from page 6 (I was able to pull this off of amazon)…”Morality is less pertinent to the shaping of our preferences and to the guidance of our conduct–it tells us less of what we need to know about what we should value and how we should live–than is commonly presumed. It is also less authoritative. Even when it does have something relevant to say, it does not necessarily have the last word. With regard to our interest in the sensible management of those aspects of our lives that are normatively significant, moral precepts are both less comprehensively germane and less definitive than we are often encouraged to believe.” In the next paragraph on p.6 Frankfurt discusses individuals that have personality defects such as being “emotionally shallow”, lacking vitality and in some cases “chronically indecisive”. He says that these things can be more definitive in a person “living well” than morality.
I have only read the first chapter of this book. However, it raises some interesting questions and I found it to be intriguing.
Thanks for the quote Michael. I will have to take a look at it but I probably won’t get a chance till the summer.