It should be no secret to those who have read this blog for a while that John and I favor apologetics of the presuppositional Van Til tradition. I’m not interested in trying to prove presuppositional apologetics to its opponents here on the blog. There are plenty of resources that have endeavored to do so, and much more thoroughly than I could.
The times I post on it will be an attempt to further develop presuppositional apologetics or to fill in some of the gaps that I find in the resources. As I talk with various people about presuppositional apologetics, I’ve noticed that the question feared above all by presuppositionalists (they avoid it like the plague) is the question of whether (and how) presuppositionalism can be effective against non-Christian faiths. Those who are antagonistic relish in faulting presuppositionalism as incapable of arguing transcendentally for the Christian God against other varities of theism. In order to do so they must break down and yield to using evidence based on common ground, or so the criticism goes.
There has been some response from presuppositionalists to this criticism (and counter-response from presuppositionalism’s critics). The response, for the most part, is good as far as it goes, but I think that presuppositionalism is capable of a more formidable defense. There are at least three problems with the way presuppositionalists have used its apologetic vis a vis world religions. I’ll focus on Islam primarily as a test case for presuppostional encounters with other religions.
1. Presuppositionalists have not educated themselves on world religions to the degree they have on atheism. Consequently, they are better at confronting atheism with the transcendental argument and have insufficiently applied its apologetic to world religions. Consider that Cornelius Van Til’s works are virtually silent on world religions.
2. Presuppositionalists such as Greg Bahnsen, John Frame and Scott Oliphint have treated world religions as primarily an ad hoc matter. They have been largely silent on the matter of world religions (though more vocal than Van Til) and have addressed them primarily for the purpose of silencing the critics’ objection, rather than proactively addressing religions in order to develop a full-orbed apologetic.
3. Presuppositionalists have misunderstood the facts and doctrines of several world religions. Consequently, they have passed on this faulty information. Greg Bahnsen speaking of other faiths states,
Is there any Muslim worth his weight in prayer mats who wouldn’t claim the same for Allah and the Koran? Personal? Check. Omniscient? Check. Sovereign? Check. Infallible verbal revelation? Check. Of course, I’m not saying that Muslim doctrine is true, only that when seeking to show the uniqueness of Christian doctrine, it can’t be found on these points (though I think one could argue that how Scripture speaks of God’s sovereignty is different than how the Koran speaks of Allah’s sovereignty).
Putting together a method for confronting world religions
No one has criticized presuppositionalism’s ability to confront other religions using a transcendental method more than John J. Johnson. John Frame and Steve Hays jointly responded to Johnson’s article, whereupon Johnson countered their response. While Frame and Hays (and others) have adequately answered Johnson’s critique, they have not done much by way of positively developing a transcendental method for defending the Christian faith over against non-Christian faiths.
The claim of the transcendental argument in its bare-bones form is that unless the trinitarian Christian God exists, knowledge isn’t possible. Knowledge isn’t possible in any other worldview scheme. Of course, this doesn’t mean that people who hold to non-Christian worldviews do not possess knowledge, only that when they do, their knowledge comes from the Christian worldview and not their own. Thus, they are being inconsistent with their worldview. Largely, it has seemed easier for presuppositionalists to confront atheism, rather than other theistic religions, with this claim.
So how does one show that if Islam is true, knowledge isn’t possible?
1. The most common presuppositional method is to point out internal contradictions in Islam and then conclude that knowledge isn’t possible on the basis of a worldview that contradicts itself. I think this can be an effective route, though it doesn’t necessarily vindicate Christian doctrine. We have to also show how knowledge is possible on the basis of the Christian worldview. One of the dangers with this method though is that we will do what we would never tolerate to be done to us: ripping verses from the Koran disregarding both textual and historical context and finding contradiction on this basis.
Unfortunately, this has been done by some presuppostionalists. Greg Bahnsen, for example, argues that Allah is too transcendent to be able to reveal himself to humanity. He cites Surah 42:11 in support of this doctrine. The verse simply says, “Nothing can be compared with Him [Allah]. He alone hears all and sees all.” Now if we’re honest I think we have to admit that there is nothing in this verse that demonstrates any difference in the transcendence of Yahweh vs the transcendence of Allah. Perhaps a Muslim could cite Isaiah 55:8-9 to say that the same criticism could apply equally to Yahweh. Of course the Christian would object that Isaiah 55:8-9 has to be put in the context of the whole Bible. He could start by going to other texts or even Isaiah 55 itself to show that Yahweh “is near” and “may be found” (Isa 55:6) and then talking about the necessity that God be a Trinity in order to reveal himself in Jesus Christ. It’s illegitimate to try to characterize Christianity with one verse, and the same applies for Islam. Presuppositionalists need to argue for the inconsistency of Allah’s character across the Koran not just with one verse and I think this can be done. This task while more difficult will be more accurate and more convincing.
2. Another approach that presuppositionalists take is to argue that the other major theistic religions are spinoffs and perversions of Christianity. John Frame and Steve Hays offer this argument in their response to John Johnson. There are several problems with this approach, not the least of which is that its hard to make the case that Judaism is a spinoff of Christianity. I’m not generally convinced that this is a very effective method in apologetics. Arguing for a particular geneology of faiths seems to be a distraction from the real work at hand, namely to show that knowledge can’t happen in accord with a non-Christian religion. Showing that Islam has derived itself from Christianity no more proves that Islam is a perversion of Christianity than it does that Islam is an improvement on Christianity. Descending from another religion does not prove its inferiority. Furthermore, if it did prove inferiority, it wouldn’t prove what presuppositionalists are going for, namely, that knowledge is not possible if Islam is true. The most it would show is that there more (or better) knowledge is possible if the Christian worldview is correct than if Islam is correct. I think it is best if this tactic is dropped altogether.
3. Christianity has the benefit of a redemptive history that Islam does not have. Emphasizing this is the positive presentation of Christianity that argues for Christianty and not just against Islam. Confronting world religions must go beyond simply pointing out contradictions in their scriptures and doctrines.
It is often said that the Bible is one big story. It is the progress of redemption. The same cannot be said of the Koran. It is largely prescriptive not descriptive. As both a descriptive and prescriptive book, the Bible portrays God as bringing the history of the world to a final point. He has a purpose and goal to which he is moving all things (See Eph 1:10). Though we don’t know the timeline, we do know the end. Christianity is both history and eschatology. Islam largely lacks this quality of history and eschatology. There is much said about an afterlife for faithful muslims and the afterlife for infidels, but little is said about the redemption of humanity and the redemption of the earth.
For the sake of brevity I can only highlight this point, but the difference in history and eschatology here has an enormous effect on the ethical differences between the Trinune God and Allah. Allah plans to show mercy to the obedient and punish the infidel. God, on the other hand, from the wicked people of the world, redeems a people he has chosen — not because they were obedient – but for his own glory. But in redeeming them they are no longer wicked. He makes them obedient through regeneration. To do this, the Father sends his Son to take the wickedness of the people on himself. Thus, the Christian God enters into the suffering with his people as the Son receives the guilt of sin and as the Father exacts his wrath for sin on his beloved Son. In short, God does for his people what they could not do for themselves. And yet in doing so he does not compromise his holiness.
Allah as a monistic God cannot do what the Christian God can do. He can only reward obedience and punish wickedness but he cannot redeem and regenerate. This creates an ethical dilemma for Allah. According to Islam, Allah is holy and each person disobedient. But through the following the five pillars one can hope that Allah will show mercy. But nothing is done with the disobedience. Allah must simply ignore it if one is to hope to entern into heaven. But this cannot be done without Allah compromising his holiness. In Islam sin is not dealt with, it is punished in some and overlooked in others. In the Bible, however, we read of the progress of the triune God dealing with sin by conquering it and eliminating it, not simply punishing it and ignoring it.
To return to the matter of the possibility of knowledge in Islam, I don’t see how it can overcome the problem of the effect of sin on our minds. In Christianity, the believer’s mind is being renewed through regeneration. Ironically, I rarely hear presuppositionalists contrasting regeneration in Christianity with the lack thereof in Islam.
Finally, I want to give a bit of advice. When approaching other religions from a presuppositional framework focus primarily on biblical theology. The story of creation, fall (if it has one), and redemption that a religion tells is the best way to contrast Christianity with it and to demonstrate the inconsistencies and moral compromise of the religion. We must look at the character of a religions god or gods throughout its doctrine and not just prooftexting from a few samples of their writings. If they cannot offer a coherent and purposeful history of redemption then they cannot account for knowledge at all in terms of their worldview, because “the fear of Yahweh is the beginning of knowledge” (Proverbs 1:7).
Thanks so much for stopping by my site, as I wouldn’t have found yours if you didn’t. I will be checking back frequently and comment when I can.
Hey Friaser,
Small world: Mike Butler just posted an article on presuppositionalism on his website which reminded me that I had promised to repost something on Fristianity and presuppositionalism on mine (which I finally did last night and today) and here you have addressed an issue within presuppositionalism as well…
I think this is very good and I really appreciate what you are trying to do. Presuppositionalism has become a little stagnant after the death of Bahnsen and no one has really stepped up to the plate yet.
You said, “Is there any Muslim worth his weight in prayer mats who wouldn’t claim the same for Allah and the Koran? Personal? Check. Omniscient? Check. Sovereign? Check. Infallible verbal revelation? Check.”
Is it enough that they make these claims? What I mean is, can this be substantiated from the Koran itself? What exactly is the Muslim’s authority base? I personally don’t know, having never read the Koran.
You said, “One of the dangers with this method though is that we will do what we would never tolerate to be done to us: ripping verses from the Koran disregarding both textual and historical context and finding contradiction on this basis.”
Robert Spencer has remarked on the Koran, “In its entirety, the Qur’an is a monologue: Allah is the only speaker (with a few notable exceptions), and with no particular concern for narrative continuity.” Spencer explains that the Hadith and the traditions of Muhammed have attempted to explain the context of verses in the Koran. Therefore, unless the Hadith and other ahadith are taken to be as authoritative as the Koran then it is hard to say that someone is ripping a verse of context since there really is no context in the Koran itself (I’m assuming Spencer is correct). Would you agree with Spencer? Do you think most Muslim’s see the Hadith as authoritative as the Quran or secondary?
Anyway, I look forward to future posts. I wish I had more time to devote to such subjects right now.
If the Hadith is secondary to the Quran then it doesn’t seem as though there can be an ultimate appeal to the context the Hadith posits. If it is on equal ground then that is another matter in itself.
[...] January 27th, 2007 at 12:58 am (Uncategorized) Some say that other religions are thorn in the side of presuppositionalism. I don’t think this is the case. While this hasn’t been demonstrated to a large degree (hold onto your hat), John Fraiser takes up the discussion in his recent post Presuppositional Apologetics and Other Religions. [...]
Jonathan,
Great questions. I think whether Muslim doctrine can be substantiated from the Koran is a separate issue from what constitutes Muslim doctrine. (Though having read a small amount of the Koran, I think they could substantiate their doctrine from it). Bahnsen is seeking to show the uniqueness of Christian doctrine in certain areas. My point is that everything that Bahnsen mentions is part of Muslim doctrine as well.
Spencer is right that the Koran is a monologue, and that it lacks a narrative context. But there a variety of other contexts. The Koran still has a historical context, a syntactical context, and a theological context. Verses can still be ripped from these contexts, and sometimes are.
I don’t know as much about the hadith as I would like, but what I do know is that they are traditions of three categories: what Muhammed said, what Muhammed did and what Muhammed approved of. The hadith admit that they are not a first hand accounts. They are generations of oral tradition that were later written down. Much of them follow the pattern of “so-and-so said that so-and-so heard from Muhammed that…” The majority of Muslims acknowledge the Hadith as a collection of traditions that are capable of error. According to most Muslims, since only the Koran has been dictated by Gabriel, it alone is without error. Generally Muslims do not treat the Hadith as on par with the Koran (I’m allowing for the possibility that there is some splinter group that does).
Still, the hadith are a guide for Muslims for interpreting the Koran. It gives Muslim a wider context, not total context. It is still possible to interpret the Koran itself and in fact, more and more Muslims are going back to a Koran-alone approach to Islam.
Arguably, Christians interpret Scripture in the context of a fallible tradition as well. No Christian ignores (or is capable of ignoring) church tradition entirely when interpreting Scripture. Church tradition gives us a greater context for interpretation even though Scripture is capable of being interpreted itself. It helps to protect us from error.
The Hadith tradition differs from church tradition in relevant, notable ways though. Church tradition is the history of the interpretation of Scripture. The Hadith are not a history of interpretation but more of a (pseudo)history of the life and teaching of Muhammed. Some of it contains ways of understanding what Muhammed said about his revelations. Church tradition does not follow what one prophet or church leader said and thought. It is the history of interpretation and providence among the people of God.
But broadly the Hadith are fallible interpretative aids and so is church tradition.
Fraiser,
The following may flow from a misunderstanding of what you have said. I apologize in advance!
You say, “Christianity has the benefit of a redemptive history that Islam does not have. Emphasizing this is the positive presentation of Christianity that argues for Christianty and not just against Islam. Confronting world religions must go beyond simply pointing out contradictions in their scriptures and doctrines.” You have gone beyond simply speaking about the internal contradictions within a specific religion and spoken about the necessary pre-conditions for man’s knowledge—namely, redemption and regeneration (the ability to know rightly includes but is not limited to these two factors…another factor would be God being a Trinity, etc.). You have rightly said that the doing away with the effects of sin is necessary for knowledge. What you have said is true. However, I am afraid that you and Dr. Bahnsen may be closer to one another than you think.
For all we know Bahnsen read the Koran and could produce more texts that support his critique of Islam. Maybe he couldn’t…I don’t know! But all of that is irrelevant. The reality is that the truth of his conclusion (and I am assuming that it is true…that Allah is impersonal) is not undercut even if he is charged with misunderstanding issues, ripping passages out of context, proof-texting, etc. What must be shown is that Allah is not an impersonal god. We arrive at right conclusions via wrong or inadequate means all the time. Besides, he may simply be guilty of not citing more passages that support his conclusion.
If you grant that Allah is an impersonal god then the following should stand as a valid critique of what you have said.
You have focused on the need and reality of regeneration as a necessary precondition for knowledge. Dr. Bahnsen did the same (argued transcendentally) by arguing that God must be Personal in order for there to be knowledge. It seems to me that you and Bahnsen equally spoke outside of Islam’s “sacred” scriptures and set the truth of the Christian worldview over against the “truth” of Islam. You both said that there are certain preconditions that are necessary in order for there to be knowledge. You believe that you have understood Islam in its broader context. But you have only understood Islam’s broader context by reading the Koran. In reading the Koran you have gathered that there is no real teleology of history. You have come to this conclusion and may even, if asked to do so, cite passages to help support your conclusion. You have simply made a systematic conclusion and claim regarding the teaching of the Koran and critiqued it transcendentally. Is it not possible to do the same with respect to Allah’s being personal or impersonal? I am assuming that this is what Bahnsen did…
Thanks for the clarification Fraiser.
It seems to me that it is important where the Muslim places his authority for having a valid epistemology. Therefore, I don’t see how we can dismiss the fact that Muslim doctrine may differ or go beyond what the Koran teaches.
If a doctrine that hinges upon having NPI (necessary precondition for intelligibility) is not based upon a source that has presuppositional authority then they have shot themselves in the foot.
Therefore, it does not seem enough that the Muslim, though worth his salt he may be, *claims* such things but whether he can tie them back to a proper source.
Michael,
I’m glad that you emphasize the importance of the Trinity for human knowledge. You’re absolutely right on this point.
With regard to the remainder of your comment, I’ll just focus on just one part of it.
You stated, “For all we know Bahnsen read the Koran and could produce more texts that support his critique of Islam. Maybe he couldn’t…I don’t know! But all of that is irrelevant. The reality is that the truth of his conclusion (and I am assuming that it is true…that Allah is impersonal) is not undercut even if he is charged with misunderstanding issues, ripping passages out of context, proof-texting, etc. What must be shown is that Allah is not an impersonal god. We arrive at right conclusions via wrong or inadequate means all the time.”
By my best lights, you seem to be making two points here: 1) whether or not we can substantiate our claims is irrelevant so long as what we claim is true. 2)When we make a claim that is unsupported the burden of proof is on our opponent to disprove our claim.
I can’t see how either of these points function as epistemic rules or even rules for debate. And I can’t imagine that a Christian would tolerate (and certainly not be persuaded by) such behavior from a Muslim.
Do you really mean to say that it’s irrelevant whether Dr. Bahnsen misunderstands the issues, rips verses out of context, and proof-texts?
The goal in apologetic debate (as I understand it) is persuasion and conversion (I disagree with Bahnsen that the goal is to shut mouths). How can I expect a Muslim to be persuaded and converted if I use faulty methods and then tell them that the burden is on them to prove me wrong?
Also, I don’t think Bahnsen is right that Allah is an impersonal god. There’s just too much in the Koran that demonstrates otherwise.
Jonathan,
I agree with what you say. And so does my previous comment. Notice that I did not say that it is unimportant whether Muslims can substantiate their doctrine from the Koran, only that it is a different issue from Bahsen’s point. Consider that Bahnsen is not saying that Muslims cannot substantiate their claims, but rather, that Christian doctrine is unique in holding to a personal, sovereign, omniscient God. My point is that Bahnsen is wrong that Christians alone make these claims.
It is certainly relevant and important whether or not a Muslim can support this from the Koran (and as I’ve said, I think that they can), but on the question of whether Christians are unique in holding to a personal, sovereign, omniscient God it is not relevant, because the fact remains whatever their support for these doctrines, they nevertheless hold to them.
Sorry about the misunderstanding Fraiser.
Michael (and Fraiser), I agree that the Trinity is a NPI by nature of the fact that it is who God is and God is the NPI. However, I don’t know that we can show this to be the case. I have yet to see an argument which demonstrates the necessity of a trinity over a quadrinity or some other multiplicity-in-singularity being. Maybe I just haven’t done enough research, but while I believe in the trinitarian God of the Bible I don’t see how the trinity is necessary for knowledge outside of the fact that that is who God is.
Jonathan,
I fear that we’re treading along the precipice of a full-blown Fristianity debate. I must say that I disagree that knowledge could be possible on the basis of anything other than trinitarian Christian doctrine. Suppose we posit a fourth person of the Godhead. What is his (or her?!) function? This fourth divine person must in some way carry out a task of which the others are not capable. How would we even begin to answer this question?
Suppose we try to and conclude that he could split the duties of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the one whereby we cry “Abba Father” and the Schmoly Schmirit is the one who brings conviction of sin.
Would knowledge be possible under such a bizarre Godhead? Absolutely not. Scripture would be undermined entirely. In fact it would contradict Scripture. I am not saying that if the Bible had revealed four persons that knowledge would not be possible. I’m saying we can’t have the Bible we have, posit a fourth person and maintain the possibility of knowledge in the Godhead. A trinity is the only way that God has chosen to reveal himself.
We always meet God in the face of Christ and when we do we see three divine persons in one essence. When we try to entertain a fourth person, it involves postulating a different conception of God altogether (I call him, Schmod). We have to say that the three divine persons are not sufficient to carry out the divine work. Furthermore, to reveal Schmod we would have to have a different Bible–the Schmoly Schmible. This would result in a different way of relating to Schmod than how we relate to God, possibly called schmalvation. The result would be an entirely different religion: Schmistianity (or Fristianity, if you like).
And so the question again is: would knowledge be possible under this scheme? Only if it was in the nature of God to be this way. But (as you’ve pointed out) a Trinity is who God is. But since it is impossible that he could be otherwise, how could we even entertain or make sense of the question of what the state of things would be like if God were otherwise? We have no place for a fourth person given the nature and work of the three that the Bible reveals.
Finally, the Fristian argument relies on a certain view on the question of divine freedom: whether or not God is free to be other than he is. In order for Fristianity to succeed it has to claim that he could be other than he is.
Thanks for your thoughts Fraiser. I would like to continue this discussion but I will wait for a more appropriate time since I don’t want to hijak you away from the topic of presuppositionalism as applied to other religions. This (your current topic) is an important one and I don’t want to muddle the issue with Fristianity. Till then,
Much to chew on,
You don’t mind if I give a link to this blog entry on my blog, do you?
Fraiser,
Thank you for the reply. Allow me to clear some things up. I never meant to suggest that substantiating claims is irrelevant or that by virtue of us claiming something the burden of proof magically falls on our opponent(s). I was simply taking for granted that Bahnsen, given his abilities as a philosopher, was not proof texting, being lazy in his critique, etc….I probably shouldn’t assume things like that. You know what happens when we assume don’t you? HA! Because I was taking for granted that Bahnsen was correct in his critique I just thought that you may be coming down on him for not citing enough texts in support of his conclusion. I’ll be more careful in the future!
With all that said….I still believe that you and Bahnsen are following the same methodology. You just think that you have understood Islam better than he did. It seems to me that you and Bahnsen both come to systematic conclusions (right or wrong as they may be) about a worldview or religion and based on those systematic conclusions you proceed to critique that religion or worldview by way of the transcendental argument. Is this what you have done in your post?
I’m not sure if you’re suggesting that you follow a method that other presups have neglected or that your critique is the same in method but superior in content.?.?.?.?
Slimjim,
Link away, friend.
Michael,
Thanks for the necessary explanations. With regard to methodology, I think I did three things in the post.
1) Correct some errors in application of a good methodology. This clear when I say that pointing out contradictions in other religions is a fine approach only we must be careful that we don’t rip verses out of context when we do so. Then I gave a glaring example of Bahnsen having made this very error (which is why I was a bit taken back at your defense of him on this point).
2)Correct some bad methodology. Thus I say,
“Another approach that presuppositionalists take is to argue that the other major theistic religions are spinoffs and perversions of Christianity. John Frame and Steve Hays offer this argument in their response to John Johnson. There are several problems with this approach, not the least of which is that its hard to make the case that Judaism is a spinoff of Christianity. I’m not generally convinced that this is a very effective method in apologetics.”
3)Add a biblical theology approach that I’ve noticed generally lacking in presup approach to religions. I don’t see most presups emphasizing an apologetical role for the redemption of God’s people as God’s goal for humanity. I don’t see them showing the development of the history of the world and its intersect with salvation. Muslims and Christians have a radically different view of human history and thus redemptive history. I also don’t generally see presups emphasizing that regeneration is necessary to properly think God’s thoughts after him.
You are certainly right that employing a transcendental approach is where Bahnsen and I overlap. However, there are misapplications of that approach and then things that have been added (such as Frame and Hays geneological argument) that need to be dropped and then things that have been ignored that need to be added to transcendental methodology.
Great discussion. It definitely helps me get clear about what I think.
Thanks for clearing things up. Your discussion has helped me also! I agree about the geneological argument…we should definitely move away from that sort of thing.
Much love
This is a blog of interest to me, as I have struggled to make Presuppositional Apologetics work in the framework of other religions. I am a big fan of Greg Bahnsen, but I see him switching gears a little when it comes to defending the faith against other religions. It seems that doing an “internal critique” of these other religions, like Bahnsen would say, leads into Evidentual Apologetics. For if we are examining our Scriptures as opposed to those of, let’s say, the Mormon scriptures, then it seems that we have left presuppositional and moved to evidential.
I don’t see this as a problem however. For me, I see it as more of a complentary way of doing apologetics. First, is to show that everybody borrows the Christian faith in order to live their lives, then switching to evidence for the Bible as the true authority, such as textual criticism, transmission issues, archeology, etc. and doing internal critiques of other religions to show their short-comings.
At least that’s the way I see it, with my very limited mind anyway.
To the OP’s points
“Unfortunately, this has been done by some presuppostionalists. Greg Bahnsen, for example, argues that Allah is too transcendent to be able to reveal himself to humanity. He cites Surah 42:11 in support of this doctrine. The verse simply says, “Nothing can be compared with Him [Allah]. He alone hears all and sees all.” Now if we’re honest I think we have to admit that there is nothing in this verse that demonstrates any difference in the transcendence of Yahweh vs the transcendence of Allah.”
I am an unashamed fan of Bahnsen, and grieved whe I see Christians standing on his shoulders and not willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.
Had you read the text you extracted your quote from you would also have read
“Sophisticated theologies offered by Muslim scholars interpret the theology of the Koran (cf. 42:11) as teaching the transcendence (tanzih) of unchanging Allah in such an extreme fashion that no human language (derived from changing experience) can positively and appropriately describe Allah–in which case the Koran rules out what the Koran claims to be.”
He quotes the passage because it is one that Muslims use to back their doctrine of tanzih.
It is an internal critque, not one he is bringing to the text.
As a christian I think it is important to be charitable.
How much more so should we be charitable to those upon whose shoulders we stand?
Dante,
What does OP mean? Orthodox Presbyterian? Original Poster? Other Person? Oblong Packederm? I’m not sure.
There’s a lot of things to grieve over in this cold, cruel world: genocide, abortion, cancer deaths, starving children, etc. Yet you’re grieving over people who have learned from Bahnsen and still criticize him. How difficult this whole ordeal must be for you.
Years ago when I was in college and only months ago before I wrote this post, I read every word of Bahnsen’s little essay from Penpoint 1996, and I still think it is excellent in many ways. I’ve read it again, and yet I still disagree with Bahnsen’s use of that text. Surah 42:11 simply doesn’t say what any Muslim or Bahnsen says that it says. There is nothing in that text that Christians we do not say about the Christian God.
Furthermore, it’s bad apologetics to use this as a critique of the whole faith because some people in the religion teach this doctrine. That is not an internal critique of Islam, it is an internal critique of SOME Islamic theologians. All Muslims should no more consider that a valid critique of their faith than you would consider a criticism of what SOME Postmodern theologians say about the inability to describe God in human words to be a valid critique of your faith. I would never raise this argument in apologetic debate and I hope no one else ever does either.
Charity has nothing to do with my critique of Bahnsen. I will be judged one day for my lack of charity in many situations, but I am certain that one of them will not be that I was uncharitable in my reading and assessment of Greg Bahnsen’s article on presuppostional reasoning with false faiths.
I’m sure all of this only adds to your grief. Perhaps you’ll find comfort somewhere.
OP= oRIGINAL pOSTER
“Bahnsen’s use of that text. Surah 42:11 simply doesn’t say what any Muslim or Bahnsen says that it says. There is nothing in that text that Christians we do not say about the Christian God.”
Its is the doctrine in question not the text.
Establishing Tanzih via Surah 42:11 is not of Bahnsens doing, it is the proof text that Muslims cite.
It is a staple doctrine, and not something alllowed to be decided upon individually. Much like Catholocism, there is a religious structure, and you dont get to cherry pick your doctrines. Muslims dont take reform well, they are at least as a rough as group as medival Catholics
“Furthermore, it’s bad apologetics to use this as a critique of the whole faith because some people in the religion teach this doctrine.”
If it is not the doctrines of faith that we look at for inconsistency, what would you reccomend?
“That is not an internal critique of Islam, it is an internal critique of SOME Islamic theologians.”
It is an article of orthodox Muslim faith, there may be some that dont hold to it, but that is by far a minority. I dont think you have researched the doctrine or its pervasiveness.
Bottomline is that you could have taken the Bahnsen article as him criticizing the Muslim faith based on their own tenants, there is plenty of material there.
Instead you chose to misrepresent his comments like he read the text and came to the doctrine of Tanzih on his own.
A very dishonest treatment of the text of his article.
“Charity has nothing to do with my critique of Bahnsen.”
Sadly here we agree…
If it had been a brother in Christ’s mistake in judgement concerning apologetic methodology…you might entertain the chance that maybe you didnt fully comprehend the statement.
Dante,
I doubt I’ll be able to make much headway when you’re committed to the conclusion that I’m an uncharitable critic of your celebrity apologist.
First of all, I’m always skeptical when someone writes an article generalizing what scholars say and doesn’t offer one single citation to support the claim. You and Bahnsen have both done just this. But I’m not going to dismiss his arguments against Islam or anything you say on those grounds.
You are wrong if you think that Bahnsen simply thought that Muslims use that text to support the Tanzih doctrine without thinking himself that the verse says that as well. In the audio debates where he mentions that text, it is clear that he is using that verse to demonstrate problems with the Koran’s portrayal of Allah. On this point he agrees with the Muslims scholars he is critiquing.
At this point, I could take your strategy here and accuse you of not being researched enough or not being as familiar with Bahnsen as I am, but that’s silly. I don’t know what you’ve read or haven’t read just as you don’t know what I’ve read or haven’t read. All I know is what you’ve said, and it’s only on that basis that I conclude that you’re mistaken. I recommend you drop the air of supperiority in comments like, “I dont think you have researched the doctrine or its pervasiveness” and “Had you read the text…”
Certainly Bahnsen is critiquing a doctrine that SOME Muslims have espoused. But due to the fact that the text doesn’t say what those Muslims say the text says (or what Bahnsen says the text says), this doesn’t qualify as a critique of the Koran. I think a better strategy would be to argue for the inconsistency of the Koran (there is plenty of material here). If the Koran cannot stand then a defense of Islam cannot either. But by criticizing the theology of some Muslim scholars one only critiques what applies to them and not all of Islam.
The fact is that there are differences among Muslims as to the degrees to which Allah is transcendent. Bahnsen has criticized one of them, but many Muslims could simply say, “That’s not my view and that’s not what the Koran says so Bahnsen’s criticism doesn’t apply to true Islam.”
You might entertain the chance that maybe I did comprehend Bahnsen’s statement but I still have the audacity to disagree with it.
“Certainly Bahnsen is critiquing a doctrine that SOME Muslims have espoused. ”
Thats my point, I am probably unclear, but from what I read in his article he is critiquing the doctrine by assuming on the Muslim worldview that the extreme view of Tanzih is correct, and shows the consequences.
Maybe I misread, but it seems that you were characterizing Bahnsen as critiquing the Koran on the basis of the Surah 42:11 text.
Where as I think the text clearly shows he is criticizing against the doctrine, which is interpreted by some Muslims on the basis of the Surah.
“Sophisticated theologies offered by Muslim scholars interpret the theology of the Koran (cf. 42:11) as teaching the transcendence (tanzih) of unchanging Allah in such an extreme fashion that no human language (derived from changing experience) can positively and appropriate describe Allah — in which case the Koran rules out what the Koran claims to be.”
If I may, I am arguing that Bahnsen is assuming(presupposing) on the Muslim worldview (even if, not one in universal agreement) and is running with a very Muslim interpretation of the text, to show that on this Muslim view of Tanzih the Koran is contradictory.
This is not the same thing as Bahnsen reading the Koran, coming up with tanzih on his own, and thereby claiming to have found a contradiction.
Dante,
I hear you. Yes, I think Bahnsen is stepping onto the Muslim’s own ground in order to critique it. He is assuming its truth for the purpose of demonstrating its falsehood. With this practice I have no problem at all. However, my point is that Bahnsen nevertheless thinks that deriving a doctrine of Tanzih from Surah 42:11 is a valid interpretation of that text, and it is on this point alone that I critiqued him.
It is one thing to say that the text doesn’t mean what some Muslims think it does, but go on to critique their doctrine of tanzih anyway. And its another thing to say that you agree with those Muslims on their interpretation of Surah 42:11 and then critique their doctrine of tanzih.
The fact that Bahnsen is critiquing them internally does not justify his poor interpretation of that text himself.
The reason this matters is that there are statements in the Bible which say nearly the same thing as Surah 42:11 (Isa 55:8-9). If Bahnsen thinks that the Surah teaches the doctrine of tanzih, then he has no basis on which to claim that the Bible doesn’t say the same about the Christian God.
By all means he should’ve critiqued the doctrine of tanzih in the same fashion he did, but he didn’t need to agree with that interpretation of 42:11 to do that. My original point in the post is that Bahnsen did to the Koran (in this instance) what he would never permit to be done to the Bible. The text is misrepresented by Bahnsen and the fact that some Muslim scholars misrepresent it too is not a sufficient reason for Bahnsen to do so.
Can I at least get you to grant that Surah 42:11 doesn’t teach a hyper-transcendence?
“The fact that Bahnsen is critiquing them internally does not justify his poor interpretation of that text himself.”
Ya, unless there is something in the original language that is missing from the english text, I cant see anyone coming to that conclusion without shoe horning the doctrine into the text.
“My original point in the post is that Bahnsen did to the Koran (in this instance) what he would never permit to be done to the Bible. The text is misrepresented by Bahnsen and the fact that some Muslim scholars misrepresent it too is not a sufficient reason for Bahnsen to do so.”
Going over some tapes I think I recall a lecture where he sort of quickly characterized, in a passing reference, the text that way or to that effect. But I dont think thats consistent with the method taught in his penpoint.
But it does sound like maybe he distilled it down for a sympathetic audience, and it sounds, as you say, like he is interpeting the Koran on his own. Certainly an error, whether intentional or not. I wouldnt characterize the man or his methods as being in line with that.
Im am really only defending the man, and only on the basis of his espoused method and teachings. We are all capable of fallng short of our ideals( and I believe you here)…I think Greg would be on your side in this critique.
“Can I at least get you to grant that Surah 42:11 doesn’t teach a hyper-transcendence?”
I wholehearted agree with you.
[...] to Share the Gospel with a Muslim A great post over at Chaos & Old Night on how one can go about showing that Islam is inconsistent, and that Christianity alone is [...]