Yes, the initial statement I make is sweeping, but it is meant to identify what science is. I suppose what I need is to tie the value of science more closely to its definition. This means that it can’t have another value without becoming something that it is not already. Maybe science could have another value but then it would be something other than what it is. Perhaps we would still call it science, but it would be science in a different sense.

The second statement is the reason why I think science can’t have another value: science isn’t interested in facts that it doesn’t think can make our lives more convenient or aid us in some way. This wouldn’t be the case, if science was concerned with mapping the world or giving us a true picture of it. You asked, “Doesn’t it seem like there is a lot going on under the banner of science that defies such a utilitarian commitment?” I’m can’t think of any examples. It seems that the scientific community rejects what isn’t utilitarian. Can you give me any examples where the scientific community embraces something that isn’t thought to make our lives easier or more fruitful in some way, say, something that is appreciated simply because it’s true.

There is a series of awards given out every year for research that isn’t useful called the Ig Nobel Prizes (a mock alternative to Nobel Prizes). Past winners include a researcher who found that Coke is spermicidal, a researcher who found people will eat stale chips if they hear a chip-crunching noise at the moment they bite, and a researcher who found that dog fleas can jump higher than cat fleas. These findings are useless and so science doesn’t have any real interest in incorporating them – or the researchers – into the community no matter what the level of proof or truth-telling. If these findings could be found to benefit us in some way, then they would likely be made part of the catalog of science.

This means that what gets considered science depends on the scientific community’s opinion of what constitutes a benefit to human kind. This has changed over time consequently so has what is considered scientific.

Again, I want to contrast this with the view that the issue of usefulness in science is secondary and dependent on the issue of realism. I hold that science’s concern with what is useful operates independently from any concern with what is true.

“…why not go all the way to ‘Science cannot reveal reality to us.’” Well, I suppose the reason is that this too sweeping for me. Perhaps science could but I don’t think the scientific community would necessarily care (even if they say they would or do). Suppose the fact that dog fleas do jump higher than cat fleas and that this is a piece of the reality puzzle. Do scientists celebrate that they have one more missing piece of the puzzle? No, because they decide how the pieces are cut up in the first place and thus, how they fit together. Einstein said very important things, but whether what he said opened reality to us is an open question, I think. Perhaps we will find that Einstein had it wrong, just as we continue to think about Newton. But Newton was useful and his mechanical theories reigned until he wasn’t as useful as he once was, and until the community decided it had a more useful account.

“…it does seem that the systematic observations of science uncover information about reality, doesn’t it?” Yes, it certainly seems they do, but do they? How do you know other than that scientists tell us, and how do scientists know other than that they think that science wouldn’t work so well if they weren’t tapping into reality and uncovering it. But this is an assumption and there is much to question about this view. For one, there are theories that worked quite well for a while which even those who accept realism as the goal of science do not accept as a map of reality. This calls into question the assumption that if it works it must be because it’s true.

I have been meaning to comment, but lately have lacked the energy to think about such an unwieldy topic.

“Science is only valuable as a tool for making our lives easier or more fruitful.”

–This is a rather sweeping statement because it rejects the possibility of any other value to science. I guess I would tend to prefer being more cautious. Perhaps a more focused denial would suit you just as well…something like, “science cannot do x,” or “science cannot be applied to y.”

“If we were to discover some fact that had no value fore human living then it would be irrelevant.”

–I guess a pragmatic approach to science appeals to me, but doesn’t it seem like there is a lot going on under the banner of science that defies such a utilitarian commitment?

“Furthermore, science is not valued for its ability to reveal reality to us.”

–This is a good example of the more focused denial I mentioned. If you’re going to deny it, though, why not go all the way to “Science cannot reveal reality to us. However, it does seem that the systematic observations of science uncover information about reality, doesn’t it? Perhaps this is not what you mean by “reveal,” but didn’t Einstein’s work ‘reveal’ things?

Of course, your statement is that “science is not valued for it’s ability to reveal reality…” But I don’t understand; doesn’t the pragmatic component imply some relation to reality?

“The irrelevance of scientific realism is reinforced by the need for realists to show that scientific realism is pragmatically necessary.”

–Sounds deep, but whether anyone is convinced of it’s necessity has little to do with whether or not a thing is relevant.

Perhaps I’m missing the point(s).

KWR